VIEW: Are we safe? —Syed Kamran Hashmi

VIEW: Are we safe? —Syed Kamran Hashmi

We do not even know about the quality of our analysis, the institutional methodology and are unaware of the qualifications of our experts. We also lack the information about the consequences of proposing contradictory and unpopular theories for a better analysis

Nations depend on the expertise of their intelligence institutions for their homeland security. Based on the analyses of the experts, states formulate policies of national interest that can have far-reaching consequences. Its prime example is the US-led second Iraq war that has resulted in the loss of thousands of human lives as a consequence of a flawed intelligence interpretation.

The intricate and challenging process of intelligence analysis therefore has acquired a fundamental role in the security apparatus of every country. It demands a dedicated organisation comprising the echelons of adroit, talented and well trained experts. It requires multiple teams of analysts who specialise in diverse fields, and are able to objectively evaluate the ambiguous and incomplete information that usually arrives at their desks for interpretation.

Typically, the data is very minimal and vague. It is even contradictory at times, which makes the job of the analysts enormously exigent. Then the experts are time-constrained to evaluate the intelligence report and have a limited margin of error. In addition, they also have to examine the real motives of the source, understand their cultural and educational background and assess the particular circumstances in which the information is revealed to offer a clear picture to the policy-makers.

Keeping in view the nature of their job, the analysts from all over the world undergo exhaustive training to develop the skills for an objective, unbiased and factual interpretation. According to the gurus of intelligence analysis, the apprentices face various challenges — both cultural and cognitive in nature, which can hamper their performance. Some experts like Richards J Heuer Jr — a renowned CIA analyst and the author of the book Psychology of Intelligence Analysis — believe that the intrinsic challenges like the preconceptions or the mindsets of the analysts play a significant role in their inability to interpret the data objectively and lead to faulty, biased and partial interpretation.

In his book, Mr Heuer explains the role of these perceptions and defines them under psychological bias of the experts. He calls them mental mediums. He does not inevitably malign these preoccupations but exposes them as a potential obstacle in formulating a hypothesis. For that reason, he encourages introspection as a tool for every analyst. He insists that an understanding of the judgements of the analyst is not sufficient but it ought to be combined with the recognition of the reasons for those judgements. He is adamant that the analysts should be self-aware and cognizant of their own psychological biases to remain objective.

He has proposed the theory of ‘Analysis of Competing Hypothesis’ (ACH) for the experts to overcome their mental mediums. He provides a stepwise approach to them in which a team, instead of a solitary analyst, evaluates various propositions at the same time. They are encouraged to evaluate contradictory hypotheses and prepare a matrix of multiple possibilities. Then, they put all the arguments together in favour and against those options, refine them and even make an effort to disprove them to reduce the shades of personal preferences in the data analysis. ACH has gained wide international recognition since it identifies the gaps in the interpretations and tends to conclude with various alternative outcomes, including those that were initially rejected.

In Pakistan, the largest intelligence network is provided by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). It is acknowledged internationally for espionage, its deep penetration into the terrorist networks, its connections with banned religious organisations and jihadi outfits.

As a nation, we depend on the ISI to obtain accurate, reliable and pertinent information to keep us prepared in a timely manner from both internal and external threats. We also expect the ISI to have a scientific system to evaluate the accuracy of the information, well trained experts to calculate its reliability and a coordinated mechanism to provide an unbiased opinion. For decades this was considered to be the case and its competence was never challenged. It enjoyed the reputation of a proficient, skilful and adroit organisation that we relied upon for our security.

But after the US raid in Abbottabad on May 2, 20122, Pakistanis were shocked at our performance and began to doubt the skills and competence of our intelligence agencies. They criticised the ISI for weeks about its involvement in politics, raised concerns about its professional capabilities and questioned its preparedness to prevent any future incidence.

The Abbottabad incident is followed by Mansoor Ijaz’s memo scandal and his meeting with the ISI chief in Britain. After the interview with Mr Ijaz, General Pasha submitted his impressions in the court, only to raise further questions about our skills for accurate information analysis.

Unfortunately, his assessment as the leader of our revered spy agency does not reveal a thorough, professional and unbiased interpretation. It fails to provide an insight into the background and motivation of the source who has consistently avoided testifying in person to the judicial commission. Through this report, it also seems that the analysts in the department have portrayed an amateur understanding of the situation. They did not have a complete realisation of the outcomes and were unable to overcome their own cognitive bias.

Truthfully, we do not even know about the quality of our analysis, the institutional methodology and are unaware of the qualifications of our experts. We also lack the information about the consequences of proposing contradictory and unpopular theories for a better analysis, as proposed in ACH. We live in the dark and only hope that we have a sound system in place that has the capability to analyse every situation from all the angles to ensure our security.

The writer is a freelance columnist residing in the US. He can be reached at skhashmi@yahoo.com

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