Re: John Crisp’s Nov. 24 column, “We all share a bit in Paterno’s guilt”:

Crisp suggests that instances where people turn away from events requiring intervention are very frequent and reflect moral shortcomings. Attributing such instances to universal moral shortcomings oversimplifies human nature.

When moral shortcomings are faulted, people become defensive and behavioral change becomes more difficult. Instead, we should look at the psychological (not moral) reasons for not intervening when intervention is needed. If we are aware of what keeps us from “doing the right thing” there is more chance of change compared to wringing our hands about moral shortcomings.

After all, we see many instances where people come to the aid of strangers. I’ll mention two subtleties missing in Crisp’s column.

First, precisely because situations needing intervention are rare, it is ambiguous whether help is needed, or if so, whether we can make a difference. It is also unclear whether the victim wants or needs our help. How often do we weigh whether help is wanted by first asking “are you OK?”

Second, the “bystander effect” he cites is more complicated than he proposes. For example, whether a victim is helped depends on the number of bystanders. The fewer bystanders present, the greater likelihood of help. I don’t refer specifically to the Penn State case, but it is not constructive to apply a broad brush to all instances where people do not help someone in need, or attribute it to human nature and a general lapse in morality, or to oversimplify the conditions that determine whether people will “do their duty.”

It is constructive to identify the conditions under which people behave in desirable ways and then either create those conditions or educate people in the fallacies of their responses to adverse conditions.

- Martin F. Kaplan, Ph.D.,

Oxnard

The author is a university research professor of social psychology, emeritus, at Northern Illinois University - Editor